VICTOR HUGO TINOCO, APRIL 29, 1998

Q - I have been here two weeks now, so I have heard a lot. And I want to talk about your work, the work in the Assembly, and other things. But inevitably I want to talk about the current crisis and your perspective on it. So where would you rather start, would you rather talk about the work of the Assembly and your work?

OK.

Q - I wanted to ask you about the property settlement and whether in fact the government is following through on the document or the law. Is it a law?

On property, yes.

Q - Because when I interviewed Daniel Nuñez two days ago, at least from his perspective of the small producers, he said - it wasn't clear to me that titling was the issue or the credit. He said that whatever it says on paper it is not being implemented in the countryside. And then he talked about the fact that you cannot grow things without credit. So it wasn't clear to me that titling was the problem or credit or both, and because you have an overview of all this, what is the deal with the property settlement these days? How is it going?

Well, there is a property law that attempts to resolve or make a significant progress toward a solution to the problem. I would say that it is one of those strange cases of a bilateral accord between the principal political forces. The government as well as the Sandinista Front agreed on that law and on seeing how that law functions, because it has to do with stability, with attracting foreign investment, etc. The problem is that the law has not been able to be applied in real terms yet. To give an example: very concrete mechanisms like the creation of Tribunals for arbitration to arbitrate solutions to property conflicts, those Tribunals have not been able to be created. So that obviously means that the problems are still there.

But the very fact that the law was approved that is already a step forward and is an advantage. The law establishes that titles are going to be given to a series of people, but that has not been advancing either. It is a problem, on the one hand, of at times lack of political will, but on the other hand it is also a problem of the real complexity of this problem. As you know that problem is very extensive in the case of Nicaragua. There are at least 350,000 families involved in property problems.

So the law is an advantage, but it has had problems in terms of its applications. This is one aspect, the legal, ,juridical aspect of the titles. The other aspect is the financial aspect. In Nicaragua like in any other country in the world, in the United States, France, Japan, agricultural activity is a low profit activity. In general many of these countries, especially the developed ones, subsidize agricultural production. So Nicaragua is not an exception. Being a basically agricultural country, its fundamental activity is basically not profitable. So the only way to make it profitable is through credit incentives. Credit incentives are generally low interest credit, with long terms that have with it elements of technical assistance, etc. So this type of credit incentives have disappeared in this country. Because the logic of structural adjustment is to do away with that. So you have a mass of producers who are involved in an activity that is not profitable, and in addition for which there are no credit incentives. And even the commercial credit that the private banks provide is scarce, precisely because the private banks do not get involved in areas that are not highly profitable.

So it is somewhat true what Daniel Nuñez was saying that it is a problem of titling on the one hand, but it is also a problem of credit, of profitability and of an economic model that does not provide a real solution to all of that segment. So it is a segment that is permanently in crisis.

Q - Are you optimistic about the eventual settlement, or working out of the property issue, or uncertain?

I think that progress is being made. At least in achieving resolving some more delicate problems, above all those problems that have an angle, that could involve actions of violence. And in that sense I think we are going to make progress, but I do not see a clear solution with this government to this problem.

Q - There was a large amount of money - I cannot remember the amount - that the Group of 7 is pledging to Nicaragua. And if I remember correctly Aleman said that a large amount was going to go to credit to small farmers. Do you think that is rhetoric, or do you think he is really going to come out and do it?

It seems to me that it is rhetoric mostly. Because the deeds show. For example right now in the Assembly the government is introducing a law through which it will it will close down definitively the only bank to promote the development of production that has existed. It is now being officially closed down. And supposedly it is going to be replaced by another small bank that is going to provide some credit, but the reality is that this bank is a type of political façade to say that the closing of the National Development Bank is not the abandonment of a credit policy for production. Even though in fact it may be.

Q - Let's turn now to the work of the National Assembly and the Frente in the National Assembly. What are the current challenges of the Bancada, and you yourself as the head of the Bench, what are the current issues that are important?

There is a topic that is crucial in the functioning of the Parliament at this moment, and it is that what is being tested is whether the Parliament has the ability to function independently of the executive [branch]. It is normal when the Executive has the majority in the Parliament that it functions with a certain harmony and logic. But another thing is that the Parliament functions the way that is has here up to now on the part of the Liberals, as a type of Office of Legislative Affairs of the Executive. Which is how it has been functioning.

This can be seen in the fact, for example, that frequently they try to jump over the legislative process, they do not send documents to the Commissions.

Q - You told me about that last year.

It is still a problem. They are still doing that. In this bill to definitively close the National Development Bank they are precisely using the "emergency procedures" as they call it. So this attitude continues there a bit. It is also expressed for example in the fact that the bills that we introduce almost never get to the plenary or to the Commissions. We have submitted some 12 bills this year. We have 8 more in the process of being submitted, and only two of them, the two that they decided were the least important ones, have they sent to be discussed. The rest of them are kept in a drawer.

So this is a problem with the process of strengthening democracy. Because you tend to think that all of this Parliamentary stuff is relative. Because the Parliament is useful if you wish to make denouncements, to point out errors. But the Parliament is not a forum for negotiating and for trying to agree on policies for the country. So I think that is one of the central problems that we still have in the Parliament, even though we have been struggling and fighting.

For example they denied us our right to have two members in the steering committee. They only recognized the right to one member. So we submitted the case to the court. Fortunately the Court's decision was to suspend the other person that was occupying our place there, but we still have not been able to fill that position. So it is part still of the conception prevails about what democracy in a Parliament is about.

Q - It must make your work very frustrating.

No, for a lot of people it is frustrating, yes. What happens is that at the same time we are also aware that it is at least a place for making denouncements. But it is a shame that it is not a place for define and agree on policies.

Q - Let me turn to the Daniel issue. So I will just ask you to talk about it from your perspective. What is your view of the whole problem and the political repercussions and consequences, and so on.

Independently whether the accusation is true or not, it has done its damage to the Sandinista Front, to Daniel Ortega's image obviously, but to the image of the Sandinista Front as well. Especially in the case of Nicaragua in the middle [class] sectors of the population. This type of accusation is an accusation that for cultural reasons, and I don't know what other reasons, in the more popular sectors it does not have the same impact as it does in middle class sectors that have a little bit higher level of education. So I think it has damaged the image of the Frente in that sector of the population.

I think that the accusation to the extent that it does not have a legal channel up to now has been channeled through the Court of public opinion. And this has a basically political impact on public opinion. In terms of the party and the grassroots of the party, independently of the fact that there are people, persons, or compañeros who believe in or don't believe in the accusation, the natural reaction has been almost unanimous, I would even say that it is predictable besides. Like digging in or defending yourself in the face of something that no one knows where it will take you.

But as I said the accusation does damage to not only Daniel Ortega. It damages the Frente. That is obvious, because he is the principal leader of the party. So when men and women that are organized in some fashion in the Frente see an accusation of this type, they don't know where how far it will go, what will happen later, and when the focus follows the pattern of a certain organized procedure over time, then the tendency of everybody is a bit like I said at the beginning is to be highly cautious about what needs to be done, about what needs to be said, or about what shouldn't be done or said. So that has been the . let's say, natural reaction of everyone in the light of a complex situation where it is not clear yet how it is going to be handled, because it is not clear yet what is going to happen next, how the event is going to develop, etc.

That phenomenon, I think it is psychological and political, explains that in terms of the Congress this type of thing is not an issue. Because the Congress for everyone is a sensitive moment for decision making where you can either be mistaken or be right. So the tendency of people is to concentrate on the theme of the Congress, on the organizational aspects, which is the essence of the Congress, and this theme is not for that reason on the table for discussion in the Congress.

And this is an attitude that is practically shared by all Sandinistas, or by an overwhelming majority, independently of the fact of whether they believe or do not believe the accusation. It is a problem of perception as to what is the best way to deal with an objective problem or situation that is proposed there.

Q - In the light of what you just said about damage to not just Daniel but also the party, some people have been critical of the fact that, or have said that there has been too much identification of Daniel with the party and that the two are not being separated, they could be separated so that Daniel could deal with this as a personal issue, and that it is not meant to be an attack on the Frente. But because of the phenomenon of caudillismo there seems to be this close identification between him and the party. I just wanted to know what you thought of that?

The problem is that in this case Daniel is the principal leader of the party, but he is a leader with a lot of force. So it would be artificial to think that you can separate so easily the individual from the role the individual plays in the collective. It is difficult separate him. How to say it? For example I had the impression to a certain extent, making a somewhat superficial comparison, but for example, Daniel is more important and either damages or benefits the party more than Clinton for example may be important and either damages or benefits the democratic party. So effectively we have that situation, and that is what makes complex the management of the situation, and you cannot say mechanically here is the man, I am separating him, and here is the party.

Besides we have a leadership problem. You have to remember that in the 90s all of the middle level segment of the party, the intermediate level of leadership disappeared for different reasons - political, personal, generational, etc. etc. And the Sandinista Front what it has is a segment of leadership with a lot of experience and history, that has been the historical leaders of the revolution. And below that you have this big gap, and under that new leadership that is emerging but without any experience in government, without experience in power, so the situation of leadership in the Sandinista Front is a bit complex for that reason.

I would say for example that examples like myself are exceptions. In one manner or another I am an exception of the intermediary segment. So I come from that intermediary segment, and I am one of the few persons that was able to remain and have their leadership grow within the party.

Q - What is the difference between the intermediate segment and the historical leadership?

The historical leadership was what formerly was the National Directorate at the time of the triumph of the revolution. The intermediate leadership was all of the "comandante guerilleros", the departmental political secretaries of the party, the principal functionaries of the government in the 80s, all that made up the middle level segment of leadership.

Q - I am just curious, where were you before 1979, what were you doing before the triumph?

I entered the Sandinista Front in 1973. From 73-76 I was an organizer and a student leader. An organizer of popular neighborhoods, because we students organized popular sectors. Then I went into more clandestine activities in starting in 77, 76, 77. I was in the northern part of Nicaragua during the war, Matagalpa, the northern part of Leon.

Q - Could you clarify what you said to me about the gap in the disappearance of the intermediate level, basically? What is the connection between that and the current problem or crisis?

You had the National Directorate in the 80s and then this intermediate segment. They were the principal leaders of the party at the departmental level, they were the principal [Cabinet] Ministers and government functionaries, the principal leaders of the Army and the Ministry of the Interior. All of that comprised what was the intermediary segment of leadership. In the 90s, with the electoral defeat, almost that entire segment disappears for different reasons. One because they are frustrated politically and leave political activity. Others because they realize that they are getting older and need to dedicate time to their families. Others because they decide to make money simply to make up for lost time, and others frustrated by the changes in the world, etc. etc.

So the effect of all that is that those people are leaving. All of those who were in the State are left hanging when the government was lost. So everybody had to find something to do. The leadership in the army, most of them stay in the army, but the army becomes, in political terms, professional, and they cease being part leaders. So you see that all of that segment practically disappears. And in the beginning of the 90s new leaders begin to emerge, etc. etc.

So there is an enormous gap between the enormous experience and authority of the National Directorate and these new leaders that are emerging. At the same time the National Directorate as a collective tends to be weakened and deteriorate, to lose their authority. So to the extent that the leaders lose their authority, the members of the National Directorate, to a certain extent Daniel is able to preserve his authority. So the phenomenon that is produced is that Daniel preserves his authority and the authority of the others goes down. So that generates the phenomenon of a leadership that is much stronger, more individual than what we had in the 80s.

Q - So one of the reasons why Daniel has such a powerful hold is the disappearance of the middle level that could have become leaders, and so on?

The disappearance of the middle level and the weakening of the rest of the National Directorate.

Q - Why is the National Directorate weak?

In some fashion they paid the price for the mistakes of the Frente, they paid in some measure for the problem of la piñata, the abuses [of power], in addition there was a tendency to get comfortable as well. A number of them began to pull out. So the model of collective leadership began to disappear that existed in the 80s and it became a more unipersonal leadership.

That is why this phenomenon of leadership in the Frente is more difficult to manage.

Q - But didn't the last Congress elect a larger number, or enlarge the National Directorate and elect more women. Didn't that have a good effect?

Yes, it elected women, it elected other compañeros, but the truth is that the ability of those elected leaders to build and expand their leadership has been pretty limited, with very few exceptions. Even though some have been able to make their leadership grow.

Q - Now I wanted to ask you about what some of the critics are saying. These are militants inside the party: the charges that there is no grassroots organizing, even in Sandinista neighborhoods, for example, because the assemblies that were the forum for that organizing have disappeared because there has been no tolerance for different opinions. There is no political education going on at the grassroots. The base is de-activated, there is a lack of enthusiasm because there is a lack of projects and an absence of strategy. There are only these large national actions which somebody referred to as "shock actions". I was talking to a Sandinista militant, you know, Norman Bent, and he said you know it would have helped if there had been some level of activity on the neighborhood level, as minimal as organizing against street crime. Because there is no presence at the local level. I was wondering what you thought about any of all of those observations. Do you think they are correct, not correct?

I think they are basically true, they are right. Maybe what many compañeros don't understand is why and how to correct them. The party has a problem that in the last Congress it was organized around a strictly territorial basis. That is to say that the base committees of the party function solely on the level of territories, the neighborhood, the village. And life has shown that the most active segment of Sandinism is not the part in the neighborhood, but the part that is in an association, a union, an organization, that is organized not based on territory but organized based on an interest - class interest or group interest. For example, the groups of retired military, the groups of small and medium farmers, workers organized into cooperatives. So that part of Sandinism in these years showed itself to be the most alive and dynamic sectors of Sandinism, because they were involved in large measure in the property struggle. It was the segment that did not have representation in the structure of the party. So one of the principal leaps we intend to make in this Congress is organize the party not just along territorial lines, but as a party of associations and unions, in addition to the territories.

So this made the formal structure of the party be organized on the basis of territory, on the basis of leaders of the territories, and not based on the leaders of the associations or unions. So this is a leadership that is very new, with a very narrow vision, very territorial that has created for us a problem of integration of Sandinism. That is why there is a tendency to not accept the sectors, the associations, or not accept a certain policy of alliances, because it is not something that somebody in the neighborhood could understand exactly.

That is why that there are compañeros who say that the structure is very closed, and it is true, but it is due to this phenomenon.

Q - I just lost that. It is closed because of what phenomenon?

It is closed because of the phenomenon that those who are in the structure are just people that have the experience of being in the neighborhood. But they don't have experience of being in unions, nor cooperatives, or associations, which has been the most active part of Sandinism. So there has been a type of divorce between the most active forces of Sandinism and the official structure of the party that has been made up basically of people that came from the neighborhoods and territories. So this is one of the problems and criticisms that have come.

Q - I am confused now. Because I remember about 5 or 6 years ago, a long time ago now, one of the critical comments made about the Frente was that they had historically targeted the organized sectors and had ignored the unorganized. That you needed to reach out to the informal sector and all those people, as apparently the CST , Roberto Gonzalez told me that the CST is trying to organize the informal sector now. And you are telling me just the opposite, that the organized sectors were ignored, or rather not sufficiently central, and that it was at the barrio level where local leaders concentrated their energies. So I don't know what to believe.

I don't know. I don't see the contradiction. Because what I am saying is that the formal structure of the party, the official structure, that is, the political secretaries at the base, the political secretaries of the municipalities, the departmental political secretaries, all come from the neighborhood structure. The sectoral leaders, Roberto Gonzalez, all of the rest, are not in the party structure. So that had created for us a divorce and a difficulty in articulating the Frente, and a tendency for that territorial leadership and the leadership of the sectors to clash, a tendency for conflict between them.

Q - OK I got it. Do you want to comment on the others - no grassroots organizing, that the assemblies were not open to differences of opinion so they just dried up.

The Sandinista Assembly in good measure is basically dominated by representatives from the territories, and the other sectors have marginal representation there. So that is one of the things that has created problems for us. That is why they say that the Sandinista Assembly, the structure of the party is very closed. And in part that phenomenon is true.

Q - And wasn't the greater importance given to the Sandinista Assembly in the last Congress, wasn't that an effort to open up the party organization, make it more democratic and so on.

Now, what we are doing now. That is for this Congress.

Q - Another problem is with the de-activation of the base, because of the absence of a national project or local projects or whatever.

About that, that is true. That is a problem of the Frente. I want to be frank. The Sandinista Front is not a party, is not a political machine. The Sandinista Front is not a super - organized party. It doesn't even have a strategy. The Sandinista Front rather is a party that acts rather on impulse, from the heart, out of feelings, of mystique and needs and that is a bit how it goes. And one of the problems has to do with, and one of the reasons for this is that the leadership of the party has been weakened. There are no bodies of party leadership that work. For example, up to a year and a half ago, we did not have a secretary of organization, nor a secretary of propaganda, nor a secretary of education. That is the result of the weakening of that leadership, and even though Daniel has preserved his leadership, Daniel is not an organizer by nature.

So in that sense we are trying to make the leap and actually have a party with secretariats that work, that have the minimum resources needed to be able to do their work, to be able to get around. And our dream or our goal, is to be able to really be an electoral machine, and at the same time a machine for political mobilization.

Q - What is the secretariat that is proposed to be created in the Congress?

There are some new secretariats, yes. It is supposed that the same that existed before would continue, but they would work. That is organization, propaganda, education. But we proposed the creation of some new secretariats. For example, the Electoral Secretariat. Because if we are an electoral party then we need an Electoral Secretariat that we have not had up to now. For example the 96 elections were very poorly organized. We need to have possibly a Secretariat of the Countryside that would pay attention to and follow the problems in the countryside, the conflicts, etc.

Q - Is a Secretariat more than one person, is it a working group, a committee?

The idea is to elect a Secretary. For that to work, to begin with we have to find a way to pay someone to dedicate their time to this. And that person could form a team of 5-6 people, who would not necessarily be paid, they would be doing something else, but they would be thinking about, reflecting and acting on their specific themes.