HENRY PETRIE, APRIL 28, 1998
Q - So I had read a snippet in the news service about what had happened. Could you tell me what your former position was in the party?
Well, I was elected in 1994 as Secretary of Organization for the Sandinista Front in Managua. That translates into being the number two person in the Front in Managua. At the same time I am a member of the National Sandinista Assembly, elected also in the Congress of May of 1994. During the electoral campaign, I was in charge of the Executive Office of the Campaign. And well, in January of 1997 I was invited, along with Zoilamerica and other compañeros, to be a member of the Commission for the Redesign of the Sandinista Front. A commission whose principal mission was to draw up a document that would aim toward the profound transformation of the Sandinista Front. This work ended in June of last year, which means that we had about 6 months of operating as a commission. And in March, immediately after Zoilamerica's denouncement, the 5th of March exactly, the committee for the departmental leadership, presided by Mr. Emmet Lang Salmeron, decided to de-activate us, William Rodriguez and myself, from our posts. In my case, as Secretary of Organization, under the argument that we had hidden information from the party, referring exactly to the denouncement that Zoilamerica was making against Daniel Ortega. And since the 5th of March I ceased to be Secretary of Organization and member of the Committee.
Q - Are you still a member of the party?
Yes, I continue to be a militant of the Sandinista Front. They haven't taken the step to expel me yet. Even though, of course, they have been some extremist members of the Frente promoting an expulsion. But I don't think that is going to move forward. At least I don't think it would be too smart. We will see how things develop.
Q - Basically I was spoon-fed by Alejandro. He told me what to ask you about. The themes I am going to ask you about are what Alejandro told me to ask you. Maybe I will just list them and then we can start. One was the organizational weakness of the party. The other was the weakness of the political culture, presumably of the Sandinistas. The third was how the Congress had been set up. But he really didn't say much, either manipulated or fixed, or whatever. Maybe that should actually come later logically. Because the third should be what does Daniel represent to the base and to the leadership. Then perhaps the phenomenon of caudillismo. I don't remember whether he mentioned it or I did. I think I mentioned it. Then we can do the Congress, and then if we have time, he gave me this, the Iniciative Resurgir Sandinista. What you hope to do, and also I am particularly interested in the sentence about "the holes in the analysis of the national situation and the absence of a project." Ok, so let's go back and why don't you start and tell me about the organizational weakness of the party?
I will deal with it and it is up to you to put order to it. I want to begin by saying the following. Some members of the Front judge Zoilamerica to be the cause of the crisis of the Sandinista Front. I think that is unrealistic and illogical. From my experience and knowledge of the Front, the crisis for us begins in 1986. And since then that crisis has gone through different moments. But the most severe moment had begun precisely since 1995. Where precisely a series of contradictions and conflicts of interest within the Sandinism begin to become more crudely manifested.
So to analyze the organizational weakness of the Sandinista Front we have to locate ourselves in terms of what is the current composition of Sandinism, and how the Sandinista Front is prepared to respond to its internal reality. So in Sandinism we find as part of its composition a business sector that is more and more connected on a national level, and which is presenting itself as an emergent business sector in the nation. Of course, because of its own socio-economic reality, it has its own unique thought within Sandinism that does not necessarily agree with the orthodox thought that does also exist within the Sandinista Front.
We have on the other hand workers or Sandinistas that are participating in what is known as the Workers' Property Area, which of course practices a Sandinism different from that that the business sector might practice.
We have also unemployed Sandinistas, who are out with the plan of assuring their daily survival. They do not have a job, they do not have a means of survival. They are not owners of anything more than a lot where they have a precarious hut. Therefore their interests are different from the business people, and even from the workers themselves that are in the Workers' Property Area. We have a commerce sector that is also very strong within the Sandinistas, that has their own connotations, they have their own emphasis in their Sandinista practice.
But let's add to all of this a series of interest groups that exist that revolve less around what they have in common socio-economically than what their political or ideological identity is. So we have a sector that calls itself the left, but within that left they have a more orthodox type of thinking, and they bring together or come together as a group and precisely exercise pressure on the party so that it takes on the positions that they defend or promote.
Q - But who are the orthodox?
They don't describe themselves as orthodox. Let's talk about orthodoxy in terms of the previous conflict with the Ramirists. But now we cannot say that within those who call themselves the left, within the Frente, that everyone has orthodox thought. We cannot say that. Because I call myself a leftist, but William Grigsby calls himself a leftist. Nevertheless, William Grigsby, I believe, from my point of view, holds positions that are much more extreme, more tilted toward orthodoxy than mine do. So there is this type of characteristic.
There are other groups that more aim at maintaining control of the party, and this refers more to the historical leadership of the Frente. So here I would include, for example, the group that in one fashion or another Daniel Ortega leads, and whose current executors are the political secretaries. Paradoxically this group aims toward closing the Sandinista Front even more, because of a supposed premise of conserving the ideological backbone of the Sandinista Front.
But the fundamental proposal is not to conserve the historical roots of Sandinism, but the fundamental purpose is to keep Daniel Ortega as the Secretary General of the party. They come together and act in order to achieve that purpose.
There is another grouping. Like that represented by Julio Lopez, William Grigsby himself, Monica Baltodano even, they also come together and fight to preserve places of power in the Sandinista Front, but with a proposal that is a bit more of a combination in the sense that they open up a little the bodies of the party so that new compañeros come in, but their thesis is that the principal decisions or the principal leaders should be the historic comrades.
There are other types of compañeros that maybe do not have a grouping as such, but do have a common idea in that we promote a real renovation in the Sandinista Front, for profound changes in the Frente, radical ones in the Frente. And this also divides us in terms of focus. Because all of the transformation that the National Directorate directed, at the end of 96, it was thought rather that cosmetic changes are what happened in the Frente. Because many of them had and still have or had at that time the interest of continuing to be leaders in the Sandinista Front. For that very reason I would say that the process of transformation is aborted precisely because there is no political will to transform it from the National Directorate itself.
At that time, I remember, I believed that the transformation of the Sandinista Front I would not place in as coming from above. Rather, from a grassroots movement that precisely would push and pressure the enthroned leadership in the Sandinista Front, in order to promote the changes that the Frente as Frente really needed; and become a real political party.
That is like the introduction to the theme. So that we can therefore understand the organizational weaknesses. So we have a Frente whose grassroots organization is almost non-existent today - the grassroots organization. I say the following. We have as the Sandinista Front at the national level, according to the registration of 1994, of 350,000 registered members at the national level. Now this was done before the division with the MRS. On the level of Managua we were able to register 77,000 at the Managua level. 350,000 on the national level; and 77,000 on the level of Managua.
So the Sandinista Front is a party that has broad affiliation in various neighborhoods and villages, there are members or sympathizers of the Sandinista Front. But we do not have grassroots organization. And where the grassroots organization does exist, there is a problem of political consistency and there is a problem of amplitude in terms of their political activity. Neighborhoods that are very populated, and with a very strong Sandinista tradition, Like for example, San Judas, Ariel Darce, Villa Venezuela, which are monster neighborhoods. We are talking about what are almost municipalities. They are much larger than many municipalities in Nicaragua, these neighborhoods that I am mentioning. Monseñor Lezcano also. That is to say, these are very populated neighborhoods and with a high Sandinista tradition. Here we have profoundly weakened base organizations.
There are Sandinistas. But they are there in their homes. The activity of the party is not developed because of the will of its organizations in those neighborhoods, or through their collectives there.
Q - Why don't they want to develop grassroots strength?
There is a political problem there. In general the design that has been proposed does not take into account the new realities that at the base level are emerging as organizational and political needs. For example, our model of grassroots organization in large measure comprises a type of organization that is called the grassroots assembly. And in that grassroots assembly the members enter in, but it does not tolerate different expressions of organization within the Frente. So the model of grassroots assembly in my judgement failed many years ago already. And there has to be a model that is much more flexible and open at the grassroots level that recognizes as organizations the different forms of groupings of Sandinistas that might exist in a neighborhood, a village or a community.
That is from the organizational point of view. But there is a political problem. There is a problem of enthusiasm. The Sandinista Front for a long time now has not been offering content for work. It has been solely focussed on resolving very national political situations like the protests, but it is not willing to resolve the community problem, nor does it assume as the daily content of the party the problem in the community, the problem in the neighborhood, and how the party's political activity is inserted there.
So we do have a problem in content, and this is connected to the absence of a project and a strategy that would take into the account the potential that the party has at the different levels and strata of society.
There is a third element which is precisely the lack of credibility in the leadership of the party. And here I want to point out very clearly a contradiction here, so that later we can understand the phenomenon of the leadership of Daniel Ortega. Here there is this belief that has been maintained that the National Directorate of the 90s should maintain a type of image of the decade of the 80s. The concept of National Directorate has not really been broken away from. It has not really been seriously altered. So people continue to think of as National Directorate, be it to get there or to expect from it directives for work, as if we were in the decade of the 80s. But on the other hand Daniel Ortega has distanced himself to a certain extent from the National Directorates.
So what does the grassroots get? The evident and real deterioration of a collective. But on the other hand they see the leader or caudillo that independently of the collective, in this case the National Directorate, is calling people for the popular struggle. There is obviously a form of collective presence, but there is also the breaking away of the principal leader, that even scorns the collective life, and projects himself as an individual.
So what does the grassroots get? The projection or reflection of an organization that is incapable, deteriorated, with serious problems of moral authority, etc. etc. etc. So that has generated in the Sandinista base a certain lack of credibility in that leadership, but on the other hand a Danielista addiction has been developing. But really what has been developing has been an organic and political de-activation. Because in one way of another the people think that the problems in the Front are not being overcome with this National Directorate, that the only one that can do anything more or less is Daniel. Even though many people know that some of Daniel's limitations, but you also have the people holding tightly to the idea of the need to struggle. And there are members of the National Directorate that really, I believe, have not been up to the demands of the moment.
But this is not a just their problem, but it is a real problem of jealousy in Daniel Ortega's leadership that does not allow leaders to rise up or move up who have been outstanding and have been promoted within the Sandinista Collective.
I would add one more element that has to do with the organizational weaknesses. That is the topic of the political leadership. What happens? We have leadership bodies at all different levels that are precarious and very weakened, with a lack of knowledge about how to administer, how to lead a party. Leaders with a mentality, who understand politics as the mobilization of the masses, as "shock" activities. And even they see it as the work of conspiracy. This is their understanding as to how to do politics. So what happens? These organizations are more for responding to complicated national situations with actions that are a bit violent, conspiratory, but they are not organizations that are permanently analyzing their own situation in their place, nor are they elaborating their own strategies to be able to resolve politically the challenges they have.
So likewise we have this in the National Directorate. In the last two National Directorates I would say that for the Secretary General they have been a complete failure. They have been a complete failure. Why? Because they have not functioned as collectives. Because their development has been denied them and castrated. And because neither of the last two National Directorates have been able to even draw up a medium term strategy, nor define in the medium term what is the type of political opposition that the Sandinista Front should do that would enrich their own activity and that would open up better electoral perspectives for the future.
We have focussed on a work that is highly responsive, very defensive, responding essentially to a specific scheme of the Sandinista Revolution, and not transcending and reaching the nation. So this in one fashion or another limits the political capacity of all of our leadership.
But one last, very serious element. And I mention here the cultural element which is the lack of political formation or education since 1985. Since 1985 we have not been developing in the Sandinista National Liberation Front a system of political education that precisely would submit the militancy at the grassroots to analysis and reflection about political conduct, about the new ideological values, about the contributions from the new currents of thought, etc. etc.
Q - Why hasn't that happened?
Because simply there hasn't been anyone in charge of that.
Q - But don't they consider it important?
None of these Directorates have considered it important. They have talked about it, they have talked about the need for it, but no one does anything for it. And it is logical because what is at the center is that if I don't want to develop a critical awareness in Sandinism, it is in order to maintain to a certain extent a political obscurantism in the militancy. That is logical.
Q - I am sorry what is the point you are making? That they did not want to educate them because they wanted to keep them passive?
Of course. That they not question anything. That is to say, in not sustaining a system for political formation, in not giving the Sandinista militancy the elements needed to do analysis and reflection, I think that limits a lot of things. First, how the national situation is looked upon. Secondly, it takes away the capacity of the leadership in their policy formulation. But the most serious. Is that critical awareness is aborted. So we have had these serious problems, because in addition to not having a collective where we can exercise a political life, we don't have a system that is providing you with the instruments necessary for reflection and analysis. Or they are simply scarce. That they submit new ideological values, and that recreate Sandinism for these new times or that bring it up to date. We cannot continue to understand the revolutionary mystique as if we were still fighting the Somoza dictatorship. I think that the mystique today, even though it does have a certain same essence, but it has different forms of interpretation today for the moment that we are living in.
Today we need more work, more research, more analysis, more political persistence than be simply willing to give your life.
Q – I have to ask you here, given this really dismal picture that you are painting, do you see any hope for the FSLN?
Yes, I believe so. What happens in this, I think that the current model is killing the Frente. I think that as long as we persist in this model, we are not going to move out of the crisis. Here we are moving more and more to a dangerous de-activation of the base. And we have to give people new purpose, new reasons to be convinced that the political struggle of the Frente continues to be valid. And that victory is possible. But in order to do that we need to change more than simply leaders. We also need to do a new formulation of a true political party. Once and for all get rid of a type of organization that still thinks it is living in wartime, and understand a new type of political opposition. And not as an opposition for conflict or for shock measures with the government.
I think that as an opposition we are going to have our own positions, our own strategy, that won’t necessarily coincide with the right or with the government in power at the time, but I don’t think necessarily that all the policies should be confronted. But rather assumed in a national effort of collaboration or as part of a national effort.
Q – If the historic leadership has so much power, and that the grassroots and the opposition is so demobilized, what can be done? How can there be change?
The thing is what are you going to transform on this foundation? Very little. So I think you have stimulate the awareness that what is needed here is a new political and organizational proposal. And precisely the Initiative of Sandinista Resurgence is aiming toward that consciousness. Here we are saying that "we need to reflect on and formulate a new holistic and strategic proposal." And we say that that holistic and strategic proposal includes the Sandinista Front as a party. So as part of this proposal we feel that new concepts of political organization need to be drawn up. We cannot continue with the current organization.
Q – Maybe we should move on to the Congress.
Now let me add just this little bit to the question about the political culture. I think that one of the big problems is the fact that unfortunately we have not integrated into the leadership or the leadership system of the Frente, those practices that aim toward consensus, tolerance, to resolve the conflict or contradictions of a political nature, and, why not say it, some ideological emphases through reflection. I can say that reflection in the Sandinista Front has not been a practice. There has been a type of discussion that fundamentally points towards dealing with the current problems. But the in depth discussion, the ideological discussion, the strategic discussion, the analysis in this sense, has been practically castrated.
So if you will it is normal today to analyze that in the Sandinista Front its vision comes up short. What new things is it offering society now? Very little. Add to that a post wartime conduct of believing that everything here is going to be resolved through conspiracy, through force, and shock activities, and not through awareness raising and inculturization that as a political party or as a government we should take on as a new methodological approach toward its definition.
So I say that all this stuff about closing ranks around this man, right, of responding in a violent fashion to this type of challenges, is part of the weaknesses that we have had for a while.
The Congress. Well I will tell you with all honesty since last year in the Commission for the Redesign of the Frente we had been proposing that this Congress was not the Congress for the transformation of the Frente. That what was needed was to begin a process to raise awareness about the need for changes. And that the Congress should be like the culminating moment of all of that process. And where, of course, there would be integrated delegates that were subjects or agents of change.
It was our position that the current Congress, this one that will operate in May, elected delegates for a very specific purpose in 96. In 96 these delegates had the mission of electing the Frente’s candidates for public posts nationally. The Congress focussed on that. And it is these same Congress persons who are going to be meeting in May. And by the way, they are delegates who in general are seriously under question by the grassroots. Why? Because they no longer respond to the reality of the grassroots out there. Which as we saw previously is a reality that is very complicated and very difficult.
But even so, those who are active in the Sandinista Front think that they have the right to elect their new representatives. And in that sense, they have not been given that opportunity, using a legal argument as a pretext that the Congress is only elected every three years. Nevertheless, we felt that what needed to be responded to was the political necessity and the political reality, and that in any case a type of arrangement would have to be made for this Congress to be able to meet in order to self-dilute itself, and call for a reflection process and for the election of new Congress members. And that these Congress people should respond more precisely to that need for change, to that conscientization process and transformation in the Sandinista Front.
This was considered by some members of the National Directorate as an attack on their electoral intentions. Really this Congress is full of Danielistas, and it is too much of a risk for some of them to elect a new Congress and see what will happen. So that is the origin of this Congress.
I think that this Congress is tainted for two reasons. The first is the fact that the discussion process at the grassroots level has been a complete failure. I will speak to you using statistics. I left on March 5th. In Managua we started the discussion in January, and that was without it having been started on the national level. But we started it why? Because we saw that time was running out on us. So I remember I pressured the compañeros of the Comite of Managua that is was vital to begin now, independently of the fact that the National Directorate had not called for it to happen yet.
So since January in Managua the discussion was being promoted and implemented [discussion of the pre-Congress documents, esp. on redesign of the Frente], and without having a national document. So we began by drawing up a [discussion] guide on the points that we felt were the most important in terms of the changes. So that people could discuss whether there should be changes or not. And if changes needed to be made, along what lines.
Since then until March 5 we were fighting hard to promote participation which at that time was under 2,000 Sandinistas in all of Managua. I will show you some statistics. At times I like to speak using data. [He is reviewing a book with figures from the electoral campaign of 96]. We had a force of 77,000 in Managua, that is the first statistic for the electoral campaign we were able to get a force of 15,000 activists. And for this discussion [on the pre-Congress] we were proposing that in Managua we would get the same 15,000. But by March 5, we barely were reaching less than 2,000, and without this crisis, without Zoilamerica’s denouncement. Less than 2,000.
Well, now some say that there is no culture of discussion within the Frente. That is true. That the Frente goes out more for action than it does for discussion. That is true. But we had already had an experience of a previous Congress where the participation of Sandinistas was much greater than what we were having now. So that problem, I accept the fact that we have had problems in getting all the Sandinistas to participate in the discussions. But not that such a ridiculous number have participated, like 1,500 party members, or less than 2,000. That is inadmissible. Even with all the problems with discussion, culture and anything else that you want to add. It is still inadmissible.
That situation did not improve from March 5 to now. Just the opposite. Almost the discussion has been considered closed at the grassroots level. And this is not just the situation in Managua. It is a national phenomenon, and I say that because I regularly go out into the departments.
And here is the statistic that I was looking for, to show how the problem of participation in the Sandinista Front has been demonstrated over time. Here is the first statistic. This is just for Managua. Here we have 77,000. Of course, in the popular consultation – that was a consultation of the masses – we were able to get 103,000 in a consultation to elect candidates. Here we got some good participation. But now here we have a problem. We had proposed participation of 193,000, and we only got 103,000. So we achieved 54% of the goal in that instance.
On the other hand, and even here in the electoral campaign we already knew that we were going to have serious problems. For example, you can see here the level of participation in Villa Carlos Fonseca. From the goal that they had proposed, 8,000 or so people, they barely got 2,000.
Q – When you say participation, what do you mean?
Of people. In this case, voting. But in the matter of the activists, we had that problem that for example, we proposed I recall a goal of 20,000 activists, as a minimum. We said that at a minimum we had to organize 20,000 for the electoral campaign. And we made a huge effort, we went out and knocked on the doors of many leaders in the neighborhoods. And at the end of the campaign we were only able to get 15,000. We were not even able to reach the goal of 20,000. Of a party that supposedly has 77,000 registered members.
Here is where another problem comes in, that I was explaining to the compañeros. What does this mean? This means we also have to change the concept of Sandinista membership. And we have to understand that it is possible for us to have 100,000 voters, but that not all the voters are political activists of the Sandinista Front. So we have to begin to make the distinction between political activism and working on that political activism, and working on that political activism, instead of continuing to think that that 100,000 is a great internal political force. So one thing is the electorate, and another thing is activism.
Here is the box on the force of activists. Here we have the amount of JRVs (voting tables) by district and municipalities of Managua. The Sandinista Campaign Committees that were formed, the achievement [of the goals] in each place. Over all we achieved 84%, what was not met, the total number of activists. 15,374. Of a goal here of 22,000. Look the statistics keep me from lying, that is why I went to get them. According to the figures, the fulfillment was 79.8% of the proposed goal. Out of 22,000 proposed we got 15,000.
So based on that, I remember as my obligation as Secretary of Organization, I said to the compañeros of the Frente, "warning, take a look at this situation". Because if we are proposing organizing 22,000 activists in campaign committees, and we are not able to meet that goal, out of a membership of 77,000 in Managua, warning sign.
Q – People had told me how successful the consultation was.
No, the consultation was a success. But of course, the consultation had a different connotation. And it was very attractive. But when the time came "to go to war", the elections, another thing was being willing to be a Sandinista activist and be out doing proselytizing work. Because the consultation did not require doing political proselytizing. It required propaganda, publicity, putting together a strong organization apparatus. That was a strong organizational experience. But it was precisely starting with the popular consultation that the crisis came on strong. Because after the voting and all the results, that is when the quarreling and a lot of things began.
Q – I would like to go back to where we were at the beginning. For the sake of our readers - I work with the Nicaragua Network – what is missing for the readers is the connection between the Zoilamerica crisis and all the things that you are talking about, the organizational weakness, political culture, etc. There needs to be a link made so that people see that.
Yes, what I am saying is that Zoilamerica’s denouncement just adds some more degrees of seriousness to a crisis that did not begin with Zoilamerica’s denouncement. Because Zoilamerica does not point to a crisis within the Frente as such, but points to a personal denouncement of Daniel Ortega. But of course, the Frente itself, in taking on the denouncement and Daniel’s own situation as its own, then that is an element that is very dangerous incorporated into the crisis.
Q – I don’t understand the sentence basically.
When the Sandinista Front takes on Daniel Ortega’s situation in the face of Zoilamerica’s denouncement, this very denouncement then does comes in and plays a part in the crisis of the Frente. Because of the attitude that the party took. But what is at the center of this? It is that the Sandinista Front does not discuss the phenomenon from a moral point of view. They do not separate themselves from Daniel and say to him, "respond", rather they completely close up, don’t listen to anyone, don’t see anything, don’t think anything, and simply close ranks around Daniel Ortega. And the possibility is closed off for any discussion about it. That goes against a party that is supposedly developing or practicing revolutionary morals or revolutionary principles, like for example the right of people to be listened to, in this case, Zoilamerica’s right on the one hand.
On the other hand I think that the very fact that Daniel has been denounced for sexual aggression against his daughter obviously deteriorates the whole image of leader that Daniel Ortega has had for many years. Logically it deteriorates. That is to say a facet of a leader is discovered that obviously no one in Sandinism or in Nicaragua every expected. Because criticisms about his leadership in the Front have existed. Criticisms about his ambiguities in politics have existed as well. And criticisms about his indifferent role in the leadership of the Frente have existed as well. But now with this accumulated, obviously it has an effect. And you have in the Frente a Danielismo that cannot be denied, so that is where we are. Doing more damage to the Frente.
But I don’t think it is the denouncement of Zoilamerica that is doing the damage. It is the attitude of Daniel, and the attitude of the Frente. Because if Daniel was more obliging to the interests of the Frente, and if he was really aiming at a more revolutionary attitude, then he would say, "I will step aside, and I will resolve this matter." But he doesn’t do this. He had kept quiet this whole time. He doesn’t say this is true or this is false. He has kept quiet. He doesn’t talk about it.
So it seems to be that this is a problem of revolutionary attitude. And to the extent that he does not act in a responsible manner and to the extent that the party continues to defend him, I will honestly tell you the party will go down with Daniel. If it continues like this, it is going under. That is the reason for my strong criticism. Some have asked me why is your criticism so strong? It is precisely because I do not want the Frente to go under. That is exactly why. Because you have to help people to understand, "compañeros, one thing is Daniel Ortega, OK let’s recognize what he did. But Daniel is not the party. The party is all of us. Why do you underestimate it? Why do you undervalue it, I tell them. The party is all of us and all of us have the responsibility to take care of the Frente.
Q – But Alejandro said that one of the problems – that you have alluded to in a different manner – is precisely that people identify Daniel with the party. He is the party, Daniel is. So it is really hard for them to separate them.
That is precisely why I have to continue to insist that Compañero Daniel is not the party. Even if they expel me, I will continue to insist, and even if they do expel me I will continue to insist that Daniel is not the party. Because you have to get the people understand this. Now there is a certain base in that sense.
Q – Why couldn’t one scenario be that as he is pulling the party down with him, that that couldn’t be the moment when the forces of opposition could then take over and revive the party?
Yes, but I also believe that you need to know how to make proposals from the very beginning, because I would not be in agreement either with playing political opportunism. I would not agree with that. That is why I have said to my compañeros of "Resurgir" that our position, our impact, if you want to call it that, needs to be dealt with in a transparent manner and from the very beginning that way. And that is the difference between us and other groupings that exist, that are supporting Daniel Ortega but who inwardly know that they will have to separate themselves from Daniel. Like for example the so-called "leftists". Not believe that these leftists are completely Danielistas. The leaders of that left are not Danielistas. They call themselves "the left" . They are within the Front. It is the group led by William Grigsby, Julio Lopez.
Q – I notice that there are no signatures on this [holding a copy of the Resurgir Sandinista statement]. Can you tell me who might be involved in this, or is it a secret?
No, it is no secret. What happened is that we didn’t put any names there because here in Nicaragua people believe that if you signed something you are the leader of it. So, look, there are a group of us involved in that. For now we are a minority, but I have faith that we are going to be a bit larger. There is Juan Ramon Huerta. He is the ex-chief editor of Barricada. There is Aldo Briones, retired army major. He is fronting for all of the retired military sector that are with the Initiative. Benjamin Medina is there. He coordinates the neighborhood leaders in Managua. He is with us. William Rodriguez is there, who is working with youth. Myself, and there are others who are part of the structure [of the Frente], but because of the "witch hunt" we have decided to not reveal their names now. Because one day later and they would come in and remove them from office, just like Henry Petrie and William Rodriguez. Of course Zoilamerica also participates when she is able. She is dedicated more to her legal process, but at times she participates in our meetings, she collaborates with some of her opinions. Besides we have a good relationship with her. We are in solidarity with her. Even though the Initiative does operate in function of her, rather it is more global. But it is based on the reality that exists within Sandinism, and you already have our pronouncement and you have our clear position on the case.
Q – It has been very interesting and useful, and depressing.
Look, I am going to suggest something to you. I think that you have to talk about things the way that they are. It is true that we are going through a crisis that I would describe as the most serious crisis in the history of the Frente. Because you know what would be the best for the Frente? To divide. In what sense? Because a division would happen because of belligerent forces. That simply are not able to agree. Like what happened in 1975. But the Frente continued to work, each one where they were. And at one moment they came back together and united. That would be the most optimistic. But what is most serious here, and that we have to fight to avoid happening. That there be no division. Then there will be a de-activation of the grassroots. That de-activation of the grassroots is worse than a division. Because that is the militancy saying no the Frente. With their inactivism, with their disdain, with their indifference – and it can’t be that way. So for that same reason I think we require a clear and strong criticism. But at the same time work to try to bring together those who have acquired an awareness and try to keep working on that awareness, in order to continue the work after the Congress, because nothing is going to come out of the Congress.
We are not working for the Congress. Nothing is going to come out of the Congress. What is going to come out of the Congress is the re-election of Daniel without the need to be blowing horns even. There will be Daniel and a number of resolutions, but after that the crisis will continue. The Congress will not deal with the crisis, nor is it the place to deal with the crisis. There was no process prior to it. So we should keep working to bring together, raise more awareness in the Sandinista base, and prepare ourselves for a moment of opening with some clear proposals that we are working on, and within which we believe there should be a convergence of Sandinism.
A convergence in what sense? To accept the reality that there are different political expressions of Sandinism in the Frente, and that we have to recreate a new ethical revolutionary commitment.
Q – Well that sounds less depressing.
Yes, and that is what we are working on. What happens is that you have to be harsh, because this is not understood. And its logical. There is a problem of upbringing, of years of habit, and by a leadership that has never been interested in moving beyond that.